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I. INTRODUCTION: CALIFORNIA'S CHEMICAL TREATMENT STATUTE

On September 17, 1996, California became the first state to statutorily
require chemical treatment as a condition of parole for child molesters convicted of
a second offense when the sexual crime is committed against a child under the age
California judges retain discretion to order treatment with
of thirteen.'
medroxyprogesterone acetate or its chemical equivalent for persons convicted of a
first offense.2 The enumerated offenses include sodomy, lewd or lascivious acts,
oral copulation, and penetration by foreign objects Under the California statute,
treatment begins one week before a prisoner's release from a state prison or other
institution and continues until the parolee demonstrates to the satisfaction of the
Board of Prison Terms that treatment is no longer necessary! An offender
scheduled to undergo chemical treatment must demonstrate that he or she has been
informed of the treatment and its side effects There is no requirement that a
parolee undergo any group or individual psychological counseling along with
chemical treatment.
California is not alone in searching for a method of effectively treating and
deterring sexual offenders. Georgia also has a statute, which grants its Board of
Pardons and Paroles the discretion to require medroxyprogesterone acetate

treatment or its chemical equivalent as a condition of parole for those offenders
convicted of sexually molesting a child age 16 or younger Unlike the California

CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(b) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998). The statute provides,
Any person guilty of a second conviction of any offense specified in subdivision
(c), where the victim has not attained 13 years of age, shall, upon parole, undergo
medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment or its chemical equivalent, in addition to
any other punishment prescribed for that offense or any other provision of law.
Id.; see also infra note 3 and accompanying text.
2

Id § 645(a).
Any person guilty of a first conviction of any offense specified in subdivision (c),
where the victim has not attained 13 years of age, may, upon parole, undergo
medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment or its chemical equivalent, in addition to
any other punishment prescribed for that offense or any other provision of law, at
the discretion of the court.

Id
3

Id § 645(c).

4

Id. §645(d).

5

Id § 645(f).

6

GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.2(a) (1997).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss4/10

2

Beckman: Chemical Castration: Constitutional Issues of Due Process, Equal

1998]

CHEMICAL CASTRATION: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

statute, Georgia requires a parolee's written consent before treatment may begin,
and a parolee must undergo and pay for concurrent outpatient counseling! Florida,
Louisiana, and Montana are among other states which have enacted or are
considering similar legislation.8
States across the country are considering and implementing measures such
as chemical castration in an attempt to combat sexual crime primarily because child
molestation is such "a serious, pervasive problem.' In addition, the recidivism rate
for this type of crime is one of the highest, ranging in some estimates from twentytwo to forty percent.10
Part II discusses medroxyprogesterone acetate ('MPA"), its use as a female
contraceptive, its use as a chemical treatment for sex offenders, and the
experimental nature of MPA treatment. Part I explores possible constitutional
violations of equal protection, and looks at substantive and procedural due process
rights after a series of relevant Supreme Court cases: Washington v. Harper,"
Foucha v. Louisiana,2 Riggins v. Nevada,13 and Kansas v. Hendricks.'4 Part IV

7
8

dk
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (providing for mandatory

treatment with medroxyprogesterone acetate upon a subsequent conviction of sexual battery); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:538 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (providing for mandatory treatment for repeat sex
offenders whose offenses were against children younger than twelve years of age and such treatment
may include medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment or its chemical equivalent); 1997 Mont. Laws ch.
334 (S.B. 31) (providing that a repeat sexual offender may be sentenced to undergo
medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment as a condition of parole). Similar legislative efforts are
underway in Texas, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. See Jonathan Roos, BranstadProposesChemical
Castration,DEs MOnqEs REGISTER, Dec. 20, 1996, at 1.
9

See A. Kenneth Fuller, M.D., Child Molestation and Pedophilia:An Overview for the

Physician, 261 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 602 (1989).
10

See Meg S. Kaplan, A DescriptionofSelf-Reports ofConvicted ChildMolesters Following

Incarceration,33 INT'L. J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 66, 69 (1989).
11

494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding involuntary chemical treatment of prisoner with psychotropic
drugs is not a violation of substantive due process).
12

504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that the continued confinement of an insanity acquitee solely

on the basis of having an antisocial personality, with no evidence of mental illness, when the hospital
review committee had recommended conditional discharge, violated due process).
13

504 U.S. 127 (1992) (holding that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs

during trial constitutes a deprivation of liberty protected by due process).
14

117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment of paraphilic sex offender).
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discusses the right to reject a condition of parole. Part V argues that chemical
castration is not cruel and unusual punishment. 5 Part VI examines the question of
giving a parolee the option of waiving Due Process and Eighth Amendment
protection with regard to chemical treatment as a condition of parole. This
Comment concludes that chemical castration may be a viable alternative psychiatric
treatment option, but only in combination with group or individual counseling, for
an extremely narrow subset of sexual offenders (paraphilics) who choose to undergo
treatment. California's statute is not narrowly confined to the group of offenders
who might actually benefit from chemical treatment, fails an equal protection
analysis, and impermissibly violates the fundamental right to procreate.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the criminal justice system has the
capability or resources necessary to accurately diagnose paraphilia in large numbers
of criminal sexual offender populations or appropriately prescribe medical
treatment for large groups of repeat sexual offenders as a condition of parole.
I. MEDROXYPROGESTERONE ACETATE (IPA)

A.

MPA s Approved Use as a Female Contraceptive

MPA is currently manufactured by the Pharmacia & Upjohn Company
under the trade name Depo-Provera 6 Depo-Provera's only approved uses at this
time are for the prevention of pregnancy 7 and as "adjunctive and palliative
treatment in advanced inoperable cases" of endometrial or renal carcinoma."
Although MPA's use as a treatment for sex offenders is not an approved or labeled
use, 19 physicians are permitted to prescribe MPA as a treatment under the Food and

15

See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

16

PHYsIcIANs' DESK REFERENcE 2259 (52d ed. 1998) [hereinafter PDR].

17

Id.

is

Id. at 2264.

19
See Edward A. Fitzgerald, ChemicalCastration:MPA Treatment of the Sexual Offender, 18
AM. J. CRiM. L. 1, 6 (1990).
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Drug Administration Guidelines20 for the "use of approved drugs for unlabeled
indications.""1
As a female contraceptive, MPA is administered in 150 milligram ("mg.")
intramuscular ("IM") doses every three months 2 As an adjunctive treatment of
inoperable cancer, the dosage is initially 400 mg. every week?' When MPA is used
in treating sex offenders, the dosage is a weekly IM injection of 100 mg. to 800 mg.
with the usual dose being about 500 mg.24 Injection is the route of choice because
MPA in pill form is poorly absorbed by the body.'
When used as a female contraceptive, MPA is "over 99% effective, making
it one of the most reliable methods of birth control available."26 Because MPA is
a long acting method of birth control, women who stop taking the drug commonly
experience a period of infertility that can last up to eighteen months after
discontinuing MPA 2 The risks to women using MPA include, but are not limited
to, irregular menstrual bleeding, increased risk of osteoporosis, slightly increased
risk of developing breast cancer, and an increased risk of developing blood clots and
stroke.28 Side effects include, but are not limited to, weight gain, amenorrhea,
headache, nervousness, abdominal cramps, and decreased sexual desire? 9 Most

20

Id

21

Id "Once a drug has been marketed, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not limit the

manner in which a doctor may present the drug. Such 'unapproved' or 'unlabeled' uses are reported
in the scientific journals and become part of accepted therapies." 12 FDA DRUG BuLL. 1, 2-3 (1992).
2

PDR, supra note 16, at 2261.

23

Id. at 2264.

24

Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 6.

See John Money, Treatment Guidelines: Antiandrogen and Counseling ParaphilicSex
Offenders, 13 J. SEX & MAMTAL THERAPY 219, 221 (1987).
25

26

PDR, supra note 16, at 2261.

Id. at 2262. "Based on the results from a large study done in the United States, of those
women who stop using Depo-Provera Contraceptive Injection in order to become pregnant, about half
of those who become pregnant do so in about 10 months after their last injection; ... about 93% of
27

those who become pregnant do so in about in about 18 months after their last injection." Id.
28

Id.

29

Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 100:853

importantly, however, only one to five percent of over 3,900 women in a clinical
trial using MPA reported experiencing decreased libido or anorgasmia.
B.

Experimental Use as a Treatmentfor Paraphilia

MPA is currently utilized as a component of psychiatric treatment for a
specific category of psychosexual disorders known as paraphilia?' Paraphilics
suffer from overvhelning sexual desires resulting in an impaired ability for socially

acceptable means of sexual gratification? 2 These offenders commit sexual crimes
' The etiology of
"in order to realize a.specific and particularized sexual fantasy."33
paraphilia differs greatly among individuals and is a complicated disorder with

many different factors contributing to its formation?4 The disorder is extremely
difficult to diagnose,35 requiring a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of the

offender's motivation to commit sexual crimes as well as the offender's emotional

30

PDR supra note 16, at 2261.

31

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

HEALTH DIsORDERs 522 (4th ed rev. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV] (outlining the features associated
with paraphilia and providing a discussion of diagnosis).
1498 (1987) [hereinafter MERCK].

32

THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY

33

DSM IV, supra note 31, at 522-23.
The essential features of a paraphilia are recurrent, intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects, 2)
the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3) children or other
nonconsenting persons, that occur over a period of at least 6 months (Criterion A).
For some individuals, paraphiliac fantasies or stimuli are obligatory for erotic
arousal and are always included in sexual activity. In other cases, the paraphiliac
preferences occur only episodically (e.g., perhaps during periods of stress),
whereas at other times the person is able to function sexually without paraphiliac
fantasies or stimuli. The behavior, sexual urges, or fantasies cause clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas
of functioning (Criterion B).

Id.
MERCK, supra note 32, at 1496 (explaining inherited or subtle constitutional factors probably
contribute to the development of paraphilia).

34

See Fuller, supra note 9, at 603. "No specific diagnostic test for pedophilia or child
molestation exists... diagnosis is made on*the basis of the essential clinical features. The diagnosis
is a challenging one to make.... The clinician should avoid relying solely on the self-report of the
patient, which may have self-serving purposes." Id.
35
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response to his actions 6 An offender's cognitive state "demonstrates a persistent
' His emotional state is "an erotic craving which can only be
fantasy about sex."37
'
realized by enacting the particular fantasy."38
And lastly, his behavioral state
"reveal[s] a stereotypical sex act because his erotic pleasure is only maximized by
the precise realization of the particular fantasy. 3 9 An offender typically suffers
from more than one paraphilia at a time.4 There appears to be a gender majority
of paraphilics.
Paraphilias are far more common among males than females, and

this unequal distribution has been found in most cultures studied.
Since reproductive competence in the female is of decisive
importance for the species, and less so in the male, biologic

reasons for this unequal distribution may exist.41
California's chemical treatment statute targets child molesters. 2 A
conviction for pedophilia, however, does not constitute a diagnosis of paraphilia.4 3

Deviant sexual behavior stems from various differing motivations. In the crime of
rape, for example, the perpetrator may often be primarily motivated by a need for
violence, or to humiliate the victim, rather than the overwhelming sexual urges of

36

See Fred S. Berlin & Carl F. Meinecke, Treatment ofSex Offenders with Antiandrogenic

Medication: Conceptualization,Review of TreatmentModalities,and PreliminaryFindings, 138 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 601, 601-03 (1981). "A diagnosis of paraphilia can be made by... examining a
person's cognitive, emotional, and behavioral state." Id. at 601.
37

Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 5.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id "All of his paraphilias must be diagnosed so that relieving one paraphilia does not result

in its replacement by another sexual fantasy." Id. See DSM IV, supra note 31, at 523. "Not
uncommonly, individuals have more than one ParaphiliL" Id.
MERCK, supra note 32, at 1496-97. "Except for Sexual Masochism, where the sex ratio is
estimated to be 20 males for each female, the other Paraphilias are almost never diagnosed in females,
although some cases have been reported." DSM IV, supra note 31, at 524.

41

CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998). The statute focuses on crimes
"where the victim has not attained 13 years of age .... ." Id. § 645 (a) & (b).
42

See Daniel L. Icenogle, SentencingMale Sex Offenders to the Use ofBiological Treatments,
15 J. LEGAL MED. 279,281-82 (1994).

43
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MPA is not an effective treatment for pedophiles or other sex

offenders who do not suffer from paraphilia.
1.

Reducing Sex Offender Recidivism

There is promising data on the effectiveness of MPA treatment in reducing
recidivism among male paraphilics. Over 600 paraphilics treated in a study
conducted by the John Hopkins Sexual Disorders Clinic reported a recidivism rate
of less than ten percent.45 Subjects who complied with treatment reported a
recidivism rate of under three percent 6 From 1976 to 1980, only one out of
twenty-five patients committed an act of paraphilia while undergoing MPA
treatment at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston.4 7 Studies have
been published on another promising medication, an antiandrogen, cyproterone
acetate (CPA), also used in the treatment of paraphilia.48 Some of the studies
tracked previously convicted recurrent sex offenders undergoing treatment with
CPA and found no recidivism during a three-year follow-up.4 9
MPA can be one useful psychiatric tool in treating the abnormal sexual

compulsions of those sex offenders suffering from paraphiliasO ° MPA is not a
magic cure," but does provide the most effective treatment for rehabilitating some
44

Id

See Fred S. Berlin & H. Martin Malin, Media Distortion of the Public'sPerception of
Recidivism and PsychiatricRehabilitation, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1572, 1573 (1991).
45

46

Id

47

See Icenogle, supra note 43, at 285.

48

Id. at 286 n.67. However, "[n]either cyproterone or cyproterone acetate are currently

available in the United States. Until October 1992, Berlex Pharmaceuticals had been making both
available in the United States on a compassionate use protocol for the anorexia associated with AIDS
and cancer, but that status has been discontinued." Id.
49

Id. at 287. Treatment consisted of both CPA and psychotherapy.

50

Icenogle, supra note 43, at 280-87 (discussing case study results of the use of chemical

treatment for paraphilic offenders).
51

Janet Heimlich, Robert Siegel & Ray Suarez, All Things ConsideredNews (National Public

Radio radio broadcast, May 12, 1997) availablein 1997 WL 12832467 (interviewing Dr. Fred Berlin,
founder of Johns Hopkins University Sexual Disorders Clinic, on the subject of MPA treatment
without concurrent counseling). Dr. Fred Berlin stated that "[flor people who are craving sex with
children, we can at least reduce the intensity of those cravings [using MPA treatment], not as a cure
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paraphilic offenders when used in combination with psychiatric counseling.52

While MPA shows significant promise in the treatment of paraphilia, it is not a
blanket treatment appropriate for all sexual criminals,53 or even for all paraphilisO
Requiring MPA treatment without requiring concurrent counseling is unlikely to
achieve the desired effect on paraphilics. The most important consideration in the

successful treatment of paraphilia is that an offender must be a willing participant

or a guarantee, but as a means of helping them be more successful at not giving in to too-unacceptable
temptations." Id
52

Fitzgerald, supranote 19, at 9.

There are many benefits from MPA treatment. The primary behavior effect the
cessation of deviant sexual behavior, is very rapid, especially compared to
psychotherapy alone. There are also several clinical advantages: 1) Patients
become optimistic and hopeful that indeed control of their paraphilia is possible.
Many were previously extremely pessimistic and hopeless: they did not think
anything could help. 2) Victims are not being harmed while therapy proceeds. 3)
As a result behaviors such as rape and pedophilia are treatable on an outpatient
basis, which is less costly than inpatient treatment or incarceration. 4) Issues
concerning a clinician's duty to violate confidentiality becomes less problematical
because the illegal behavior stops early. 5) Concurrent psychotherapies may
proceed without the patient having to deal with the discouraging problem of
weekly or even daily recidivism causing him to ignore the small gains of weekly
psychotherapy. 6) Clinician's are encouraged by the rapid and apparent success
of treatment compared to more traditional therapies where effects are less certain.
Id. at 9 n.49.
53

Id. at9.

Icenogle, supra note 43, at 285.
Clearly, though, not all paraphilics respond to MPA. In a study from Sherbrooke
Hospital in Quebec, only 40 of 80 patients treated with MPA responded with
decreased fantasies. This study included just over one year of treatment with
MPA and three years of post-treatment follow up, with some patients remaining
on MPA throughout the follow up and others being tapered off of it. Of those
who initially responded to the MPA, none resumed their paraphilic behavior
during the follow up.
Id. at 285-86. But see Ethel S. Person, Paraphiliasand Gender Identity Disorders, I PSYCHIATRY
46, at 11 (Lippincott-Raven rev. ed., 1994).
[T]he primary method of treating the paraphilia itself is a psychoanalytically
oriented therapy ....But even this kind of intensive intervention is no guarantee
of success. Although there are case reports of good results, there are no long term
follow-up studies. However, few therapists would claim a high percentage of
positive results in patients with full-blown perverse syndromes. The patient's
overall adaptation may well improve, but permanent change in the perverse
structure is more problematic.
54
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in order for treatment to be successful.55 Long term psychotherapy, the traditional
treatment, is recommended, but has not proven to be particularly successful when
used alone, 56 especially when an offender is participating involuntarily. MPA
therapy is also most effective when the offender voluntarily participates in chemical
treatment concurrently with counseling 7

55

Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 9; MERCK, supra note 32, at 1498.

56

MERCK, supra note 32, at 1498; Patricia M. Harris, Ph.D., Prison-BasedSex Offender

Treatment Programsin the PostSexual PsychopathEra, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 555 (1995).
Psychotherapy and other supportive measures can help the patient... adjust more
effectively to the consequences of paraphilic activity. Psychotherapy is useful in
the treatment of some child molesters but probably not all although the literature
on individual psychotherapy for child molesters is sparse and preponderantly
consists of case reports.... Group psychotherapy has been evaluated poorly in
general. Outcome studies are mixed and ambivalent.
Fuller, supranote 9, at 604.
MERCK, supra note 32, at 1498 ("Long-term psychotherapy usually is necessary but is not
always successful. It is less useful when coercive, e.g., by court order."); See also Fitzgerald, supra
note 19, at 8-9.
MPA has proven to be a successful treatment for the paraphilic offender when
used under the following conditions. First, the offender volunteers for treatment.
Second, the offender lacks an antisocial personality pathology. Third, the offender
does not have a severe substance abuse problem. Fourth, the dosage is sufficient
to suppress the testosterone production. Fifth, a consenting pair-bonded partner
is available.
Id. See Heimlich, Siegel & Suarez, supra note 51 (interviewing Dr, Fred Berlin; founder of Johns
Hopkins University Sexual Disorders Clinic, on the subject of MPA treatment without concurrent
counseling). Dr. Berlin remarked, "If someone were to impose upon me castration, if I had no sense
of how this was going to be helpful if this wasn't combined with psychological and emotional support,
I might simply become a very angry and disenfranchised person, and not necessarily a safer individual
in the community." Id.
57
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Hormonal treatmentf 8 and anti-androgen therapy are treatments that have
shown some success for certain subcategories of paraphilia including pedophiles. 9
MPA is a progestinic hormone that decreases the production and effects of
testosterone and "reduces erotic imagery," thus providing the offender with relief
from his compulsive fantasy
Decreasing the testosterone level in the male
decreases libido and diminishes a paraphilic's sexual compulsions' Ending the
sexual compulsion brings uncontrollable sexual urges within the offender's control
and enables the paraphilic to benefit from the traditional forms of psychotherapy
such as counseling. 2 MPA acts on the overall male sex drive, decreasing normal
as well as abnormal sexual desires.63 Side effects in men are infrequent and end

58

Icenogle, supranote 43, at 283-85.

Hormones... have been used to reduce the sex drive. Each of the hormones used
accomplishes this by lowering the testosterone level .... Currently, the most
commonly used hormone is medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA). Several studies
have demonstrated its effectiveness in the treatment of sexual offenders. The
mechanism by which MPA lowers libido is not completely understood. While it
does lower the serum testosterone, both by increasing testosterone metabolism by
the liver and decreasing the release of LH and FSH from the brain (which
decreases the release of testosterone by the testes), the ability of MPA to decrease
paraphilic behavior seems to go beyond this and also may be due to a tranquilizing
effect on the brain.
Id. at 284. "Medications have been used to suppress paraphilic symptoms. Child molesters may
benefit from the use of... medroxyprogesterone acetate .... Medications should not be used alone;
concomitant psychotherapy, behavior therapy, or psychosocial rehabilitation is indicated." Fuller,
supranote 9, at 604. But see Person, supra note 54, at 10.
Aversion therapy and treatment with antiandrogenic medication have been
attempted both with sex offenders and with patients with paraphilias. The studies
have not been systematic nor are the results encouraging. Short-term control is
easier to obtain than fundamental long-term change. The limitation to the therapy
is often the patient's noncompliance in taking medication. The main limitation to
antiandrogenic medication is, in fact, its mode of operation; it acts by reducing
sexual desire, not by selectively inhibiting deviant impulses. Over several years,
patients may be unwilling to give up sexual pleasure.

Id.
59

MERCK, supra note

60

Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 6. See Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 36, at 603.

61

Icenogle, supra note 43, at 283.

62

Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 8-9.

63

Icenogle, supra note 43, at 284.

32, at 1498.
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when treatment with the drug is discontinued.' The male's full sex drive returns
within a week to ten days.6' In addition, "MPA does not cause impotence." 6 Case
studies have shown some males can still engage in sexual activity while undergoing
treatment with MPA.67 Statutorily requiring MPA treatment as a condition of parole
makes such treatment mandatory, if an offender is not allowed the option to reject
parole and remain incarcerated. For MPA treatment to be effective, however, an
offender must want to be rehabilitated, he must want treatment, not be forced into
it by the state. Therefore, requiring offenders to undergo treatment as a condition
of parole will not decrease offender recidivism by rehabilitation if the offender does
not want to reform his behavior; MPA is not a magic cure for paraphilia in spite of
the paraphilic.
2.

The Experimental Nature of MPA Treatment

MPA has never before been administered to such a large group of sex
offenders within the criminal justice system. Statutorily mandated MPA treatment
as a condition of parole, therefore, requires parolees to participate in an
experimental medical treatment program.
Dosage levels reducing the sexual drive in male paraphiliacs to a level
allowing offenders to control their criminal sexual behavior are still experimental.68
Treatment typically consists of weekly IM injections of 500 mg. of MPA, with
dosage varying between 100 mg. to 800 mg. 9 California's statute requires
treatment to begin only one week before an offender is released from prison.7 The
lack of medical certainty concerning appropriate dosages for individual sexual
offenders, combined with the initial administration of treatment only one week prior
to release, raises the question of whether a dosage that is adequate to achieve the

64

Fitzgerald, supranote 19, at 7.

65

Money, supra note 25, at 220.

6

Fitzgerald, supranote 19, at 7.

67

Id.

68

See Linda S. Grossman, Research Directions in the Evaluation and Treatment of Sex

Offenders: An Analysis, 3 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 421,435 (1985).
69

Money, supranote 25, at 219-21 (1987). The pill form of MPA "is not satisfactory for the

treatment of paraphilia." Id. at 221.
70

CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(d) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).
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state's goal of safeguarding the public can be determined within one week. It is
doubtful whether an accurate dosage is determinable for each individual within such
a short time, considering that the treatment will be administered to a large diverse
population of offenders. Presumably an offender must attend weekly appointments
with a physician to verify cooperation with the treatment and dosage can then be
adjusted.
In addition, the long term effects of MPA are unknown because of the
relatively recent use of the drug as a prevalent psychiatric treatment for paraphilia."
This is an especially troublesome point given California's statutory requirement that
MPA treatment continue until a parolee can demonstrate that treatment is no longer
necessary,72 making life-long treatment a distinct possibility. It is not known
whether MPA decreases paraphilic offender recidivism in large groups of the
criminal sexual offender population. The majority of studies to date have based
their conclusions on results gathered from individuals or small groups of
participants participating in psychiatric treatment programs 3 MPA as a condition
of parole is an experimental treatment because (1) long- term effects are unknown
due to a lack of long-term studies conducted with MPA, (2) appropriate dosage is
uncertain, and (3) because the drug has not been approved by the FDA for use in
people with paraphilias.7 4
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY A
MANDATORY CHEMICAL TREATMENT STATUTE

Requiring sex offenders convicted of a second offense to undergo chemical
treatment as a condition of parole implicates several constitutional issues: equal
protection, the due process clause, and the cruel and unusual punishment
prohibition.
A.

EqualProtection Violation

California's chemical castration statute fails under a gender discrimination
equal protection argument because, although it is facially neutral7 its effect is to
71

Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 7-8.

72

CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(d) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).

73

Fuller, supra note 9, at 604.

74

See generally PDR, supra note 16, at 2080.

75

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(a), (b), & (d) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).
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impose state mandated chemical sterilization on women sex offenders while doing
almost nothing to further the state's interest in reducing recidivism in this group.
In contrast, the state can cite medical studies demonstrating that MPA reduces
recidivism in male patients, thereby achieving the overriding important result of
public safety.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from "deny[ing] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."76 This right to equal
protection does not prevent a state from creating different classifications or treating
those persons within the different classifications unequally, but does forbid
classifications based on criteria unrelated to a state's asserted purpose.' In Skinner
v. Oklahoma,78 which held Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act
unconstitutional under an equal protection analysis, the Supreme Court recognized
a state's right to exercise its police power to treat different classes of offenders
differently.79 This holding was reiterated in Craigv. Boren," when the Court said
a state has met its burden when it "indicates a policy, applies it to all within the
lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as
means allows.""1 California's chemical treatment statute permissibly subdivides
criminals into those who commit sexual offenses and those who don't. The statute
further permissibly differentiates between those sexual offenders who are repeat
offenders and those who are not.' The California statute applies to repeat male and
female sexual offenders who commit an enumerated sexual crime against children
younger than thirteen, 3 and was apparently written specifically to survive an equal
protection argument based on unequal treatment.

76

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

77

See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).

78

316 U.S. 535 (1942). Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act defined habitual

criminals for purposes of sterilization as persons convicted of two or more crimes "amounting to
felonies involving moral turpitude" in any state and convicted again in Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 57, § 171-195 (West 1935).
79

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540.

80

429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating state statutes prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males

under age 21 and females under age 18).
81

Id at 197.

82

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).

83

See CAL.

PENAL CODE

§ 645(b) and (d) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).
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Two separate equal protection arguments are applicable to California's
chemical treatment statute as written: gender discrimination (based not on unequal
treatment, but on unequal effect: the physiological gender-related effect of MPA on
women), and an unconstitutional classification among male sex offenders (based on
requiring sexual offenders to undergo chemical treatment without differentiating
between those offenders who would benefit from treatment and those who would
not).
1.

California's Chemical Treatment Statute Fails a Gender
Discrimination Challenge

California's chemical treatment statute is facially neutral, applying equally
to both male and female repeat sexual offenders,84 but is unconstitutional under a
gender discrimination equal protection analysis. To withstand an equal protection
challenge based on gender discrimination, the statute generally must survive the
Supreme Court's intermediate level scrutiny by showing that the statute serves an
important state purpose and is substantially related to achieving the asserted
purpose. 6 California's societal protection purpose in enacting a chemical treatment
statute is undeniably important: the state has an important interest in deterring
recidivism in sexual offenders who prey on children by requiring twice-convicted
child molesters to undergo chemical treatment as a condition of parole.87 The
documented studies showing a decrease in recidivism among male paraphilic
patients undergoing MPA treatment in conjunction with counseling support the
inference that the statute is substantially related to achieving the stated purpose with
regard to male sexual offenders.88 However, the state is unable to meet its burden
of substantial relationship when the statute is applied to female sexual offenders89
.because the treatment is virtually ineffective in decreasing the female libido.
MPA's positive effect of decreasing recidivism of sex offenders is thought to be
directly related to the drug's ability to decrease the sexual drive or libido of

84

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(b) and (d) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).

85

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST. LAW § 16.26: GENDER DIsCRIMINATION, 1561-

88 (2d ed. 1988).
86

See generally Craig,429 U.S. at 197.

87

See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(b) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).

88

See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.

89

PDR, supra note 16, at 2261.
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paraphilis. 9° MPA decreases the libido or sex drive in only a very small percentage
of females.9 ' Requiring female sexual offenders to undergo chemical treatment with
MPA as a condition of parole would effectively sentence all repeat female sexual
offenders convicted of an enumerated offense to state imposed sterility while
accomplishing the state's purpose of decreasing recidivism in only one to five
percent.93 Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional as applied to women because
the state cannot meet its burden of substantial relationship.
A hypothetical statute requiring only male repeat sexual offenders to
undergo chemical treatment with MPA as a condition of parole might survive the
intermediate level scrutiny required for discrimination based on gender because of
MPA's actual differing physiological effects.94 In Michael M v. Superior Court,95
a narrowly divided Supreme Court upheld a California statute punishing only men
for the crime of statutory rape. In Michael M, the state's important purpose was
the reduction of teenage pregnancy, and the Court held that punishing only males
was substantially related to achieving that important goal?7 Justice Stewart,
concurring, wrote that "the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that the
physiological differences between men and women must be disregarded ....The
Constitution surely does not require a State to pretend that demonstrable differences
'
There is a demonstrable
between men and women do not really exist."98
physiological difference between men and women in the effects of the currently

90

Icenogle, supranote 43, at 282.

91

PDR, supra note 16, at 2261.

92

See generally id. (describing Depo-Provera (MPA) as 99% effective in preventing

pregnancy).
93

See generally id.

See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
461 (1988) (discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy are usually reviewed under
intermediate scrutiny).
94

95

450 U.S. 464 (1981).

96

Id at 470-73.

97

Id. at 472-73.

98

Id. at 481 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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available drugs used in the treatment of sexual offenders;9 9 therefore, a state could
permissibly require only males to undergo chemical treatment as a condition of
parole. In addition, paraphilia is in large part a male disorder, adding strength to the
state's argument for differentiation based on physiology."° States are not required,
under the equal protection clause, to disqualify a valid treatment method simply
because the sole available treatment is effective for only one gender.'' A statute
requiring chemical treatment only for male repeat sex offenders is not an
unconstitutional violation of equal protection, given that the reason for the
distinction between men and women is based on demonstrable physiologic
differences in the efficacy of the treatment and not on stereotypical
misrepresentations of gender."
2.

Permissible Classification, Impermissibly Over-inclusive

California's chemical treatment statute unconstitutionally requires all repeat
sex offenders convicted of a second specifically enumerated offense to undergo
chemical treatment as a condition of parole regardless of whether the offender is
3
diagnosed as suffering from paraphilia or some other psychiatric disorder.'
Failing to differentiate between those offenders who would benefit from chemical
treatment (paraphilics) and those who do not makes California's statute
impermissibly over-inclusive and therefore unconstitutional.
A statute separating a narrow, medically identifiable subgroup of sex
offenders from all other sex offenders and non-sex offenders for the purpose of
requiring chemical treatment as a condition of parole is not an impermissible
classification under the equal protection clause.'O Classification based on an

99

PDR, supra note 16, at 2081.

100
See MERCK, supra note 32, at 1496-97; DSM IV, supra note 31, at 534 (stating that
"Paraphilias are almost never diagnosed in females although some cases have been reported:). The
assumption that the treatment method is valid is made only for the sake of the equal protection

argument.
101

See MichaelM., 450 U.S. at 481 (Stewart, J., concurring).

102

See id.

103

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(b) & (c) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).

104

See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (upholding an Oklahoma law

subjecting opticians but not sellers of ready wear glasses to a regulatory system: "Evils in the same
[o]r the reform
field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies ....
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute.");
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objective psychiatric evaluation, °5 not on a suspect or semi-suspect classification
such as race, gender, or illegitimacy, might survive an equal protection argument.106
Furthermore, a statute classifying repeat paraphilic sex offenders for the purpose of
receiving parole conditioned on chemical treatment may merit only rational basis
scrutiny by the Supreme Court. 10 7 The state could pass this low level scrutiny by
showing that requiring a narrow, medically identifiable subgroup of repeat male sex
offenders to undergo chemical treatment with MPA as a condition of parole is
rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of protecting its children from child
molesters,' 8 based on numerous reputable scientific studies supporting the premise
that chemical treatment with MPA is effective when used in conjunction with
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (upholding a regulation placing a welfare limit
of $250 per month per family regardless of family size or need: "[The Equal Protection Clause does
not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all.").
105

It is not at all clear, however, that an evaluation will be objective. See Person, supra note

54, at 9 ("Accurate diagnosis depends on eliciting the paraphilic fantasy and ritualized behavior. The
achievement of sexual excitement must depend on either the mental elaboration or behavioral
enactment of the deviant fantasy .... Differential diagnosis is usually relatively easy." ) But see DSM
IV, supra note 31, at 522-23 (discussing two categories of criteria the individual must fulfil in order
to be diagnosed with paraphilia). Criterion A is that the fantasies are recurrent and sexually arousing,
and occur over a period of at least six months. Id Criterion B states that the "behavior, sexual urges,
or fantasies cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning." Id. The diagnosis appears to depend upon deviant sexual behavior
and mental states. Although it is objectively possible to determine if a sex offender, who is found
guilty of deviant sexual behavior, commits such behavior, it is a subjective evaluation regarding an
individual's mental state regarding recurrent, arousing sexual fantasies. Assessing mental state
depends on an individual's subjective perception, and his honesty in relating his mental state. There
is no objective test to determine if the individual is telling the truth about his feelings. See generally
id. at 524 (discussing penile plethysmography, a mechanical technique of assessing an individual's
sexual response to visual and auditory stimuli). "The reliability and validity of this procedure in
clinical assessment have not been well established, and clinical experience suggests that subjects can
simulate response by manipulating mental images." Id.
106
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding as unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment statutes giving spouses of male military personnel dependent
status and military benefits, but not giving spouses of female military personnel dependent status unless
they could prove they depended on wives for over one-half their support); Weinberger v. Wisenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975) (striking down provision of Social Security Act awarding survivor's benefits to
widows, but not widowers, responsible for dependent children); Orr v. On, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(invalidating laws that require alimony payment only from men).
107

See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 103.

108

See Fitzgerald,supra note 19, at 8-9; PDR, supranote 16, at 1498; Icenogle, supra note 43,

at 281-89.
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psychotherapy in reducing male paraphilic recidivism 9 This classification is
under-inclusive as it excludes some sex offenders from treatment and thereby from
parole, but the Supreme Court has stated "[t]he state [is] not bound to deal alike
with all.., classes, or to strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way.""'
Under-inclusion in this instance is permissible because sex offenders who are not
paraphilic are not effectively helped by MPA treatment,"' and it is possible that all
paraphilics might not be candidates for MPA treatment due to various individual
medical contraindications or because they do not want to receive treatment. The
Court recently stated, in Kansas v. Hendricks,"' that "when a legislature undertakes
to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options
must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation."'1
California's chemical treatment statute is an attempt to deal with an area "fraught
with medical... uncertaint[y],.. 4 but is not drawn narrowly enough to survive even
rational basis scrutiny. The statute does not separate paraphilic sex offenders from
other types of sex offenders who molest children. Requiring all repeat sex
offenders, regardless of their underlying motivation for committing sexual crimes
against children, to undergo chemical treatment as a condition of parole means that
many sex offenders whose sexual disorders are not affected by MPA will be
released on parole and made to undergo chemical treatment with MPA. MPA is not
effective in decreasing recidivism in the offender population that is not paraphilic;
therefore, requiring treatment of such a population does nothing to further the
state's interest in safeguarding the public. Furthermore, MPA treatment is not
necessarily successful in every paraphilic. Before a state orders chemical treatment,
the parolee should undergo an extensive psychiatric evaluation, be diagnosed as
suffering from paraphilia by a competent psychiatrist, receive a medical
determination that MPA is a treatment beneficial to him, and be willing to undergo
MPA treatment along with concurrent counseling. Only then can a state and its
109

110

• Icenogle, supra note 32, at 281-89.
Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935).

il

See, Fuller, supra note 9, at 604 ("Personalities, attitudes, deviant arousal, and clinical
features of individuals who abuse children differ substantially. As a result of this variability the same
treatment is unlikely to be equally suitable for all.").
112

117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).

113

Id. at 2081 n.3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (adding that disagreement

within the psychiatric profession on the proper definition of mental illness does not "tie the State's
hands" in drafting "civil commitment laws").
114

Id.
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citizens have any degree of confidence that the sex offenders receiving parole under
a chemical treatment program are those offenders who might actually be helped by
the treatment, producing the desired result of protecting society from paroled child
molesters.

It is questionable whether a state can marshal and sustain the resources
required to adequately conduct such detailed procedures for each repeat sex
offender. States are currently unable to adequately meet the traditional psychiatric
counseling needs of paraphilics in prison," 5 which are less procedurally
complicated and less expensive than administering a chemical treatment program
116
with the necessary level of oversight.
Chemical treatment is a relatively new, alternative treatment for paraphilia
that has shown some promise in reducing recidivism among a narrow, medically
identifiable subgroup of sex offenders.117 Legislatures should be able to require
treatment of the appropriate classification of sex offenders that medical science has
identified would benefit from treatment,". but only if a state is able to demonstrate
it has the capability and resources required to accurately apply appropriate
treatment to the identified group.

115

Patricia M. Harris, Prison-BasedSex Offender Treatment Programs in the Post Sexual

PsychopathEra,23 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 555 (1995).
The scope of prison sex offender treatment programs is much more narrow than
their labels suggest. Contemporary sex offender treatment programs favor
offenders who victimize children .... Offenders who victimize adults, usually
referred to as rapists, either fail to meet stringent program selection criteria or are
considered undesirable due to incompatibility with program methods ....
Moreover, the very small number of treatment slots available in most programs
can accommodate only a tiny percentage of persons identified as sex offenders.
Most programs handle few offenders and require limited involvement from them,
usually on a voluntary basis, for periods of as little as two hours per week. Even
in the so-called residential programs, where subjects are housed together in the
same living unit and are provided with more extensive treatment, very few
offenders are treated. The Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers, one of
the largest residential programs, can treat only 80 offenders at a time although at
least 3,000 known sex offenders are incarcerated in Connecticut prisons.
Id. at 561-70 (footnotes omitted).
116

See Fuller, supra note 9, at 604. "Most physicians are in no way equipped to treat

perpetrators of child sexual abuse and should refer the patient to a psychiatrist or psychologist with a
special interest in the treatment of sexual offenders." Id.
117

Icenogle, supra note 43, at 279.

118

See Kansas, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
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B.

Substantive Due Process andFundamentalRights

The Fourteenth Amendment 9 prohibits a state from depriving its citizens
of "life, liberty or property, without due process of law.""12 Substantive due process
" involves a definition of th[e] protected constitutional interest, as well as
identification of the conditions under which competing state interests might
outweigh it.'' Identified liberty interests include "not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
""
home and bring up children ....
The Supreme Court, in Washington v. Glucksberg,'2 stated that the
established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two
primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition. Second, we have required in substantive due
process cases a careful description of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest.124
The Court also noted that "the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the
government to infringe ... fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what
process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest."'" California's involuntary chemical treatment statute
implicates at least two fundamental liberty issues: the right to procreate (because
MPA is a female contraceptive), and the right to'bodily integrity (because the
amend. XIV.

119

U.S. CONST.

120

Id.

121

Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (cited with approval in Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)).
122

123
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (establishing that assistance in
committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected under the due process clause and
outlining a substantive due process analysis).
124

Id. at 2268 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

12

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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statute calls for involuntary drug treatment that alters biological functioning as a
condition of parole).
1.

An Impermissible Violation of a Female's Fundamental
Right of Procreation

It is undeniable that a woman's fundamental right of procreation is
impermissibly violated by California's chemical treatment statute because the
chemical treatment serves no compelling state interest. 26 Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority in Skinner v. Oklahoma, declared procreation to be one of the
"basic civil rights of man," which is "fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race." '27 MPA is over ninety-nine percent effective in preventing
pregnancy,' and effectively renders female sex offenders undergoing mandatory
MPA treatment sterile for the duration of treatment. Such treatment, however, is
ineffective in accomplishing the state's goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and
public safety because there is no evidence that MPA treatment decreases the female
sex drive.' Imposing state mandated sterilization without an accompanying state
justification for this violation of a fundamental right fails even rational basis review.
As applied to women, California's statute fails the substantive due process
argument based on the women's fundamental right to procreate. Therefore, this
Section attempts to analyze California's chemical treatment statute using a
hypothetical drug which is effective in decreasing the libido of both women and
men, but, similar to MPA, temporarily sterilizes women. A state's chemical
treatment statute might survive this substantive due process attack if the
hypothetical drug treatment had the same contraceptive effect in women as does
MPA, but, unlike MPA, significantly furthers the state's purpose of reducing
recidivism in women as well as in men. The analysis is undertaken on speculation
that medical science may discover or create such a drug and that a result of
sterilization, especially if temporary, may not be fatal to a treatment.
The impairment of the fundamental right to procreate struck down by the
Court in Skinner 3 ' is distinguishable in an important way from the impairment of
126

PDR, supra note 16, at 2079.

127
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that 15rocreation is one of the "basic
civil rights of man," which is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race").
128

PDR, supra note 16, at 2081.

129

Id

130

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss4/10

22

Beckman: Chemical Castration: Constitutional Issues of Due Process, Equal
CHEMICAL CASTRATION: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

1998]

this same right under a chemical treatment statute. Although female sex offenders
would still be subject to state mandated sterilization, the sterilization by chemical
treatment is temporary. Women who stop using a contraceptive are no longer
sterile. In Skinner, the state of Oklahoma sentenced persons convicted of two or
more particular felonies to surgical castration."' 1 Surgical castration is permanent;
chemical castration is not.' Male sexual offenders undergoing chemical treatment
Males
may not even experience actual impairment of the right to procreate"
' but are still able to
undergoing treatment with MPA experience "erotic apathy,"134
achieve an erection and ejaculation. 3 5 Some male patients undergoing treatment
with MPA have reported only a minimal decrease in consensual sexual activity.'36
The male sex drive generally returns within seven to ten days of discontinuing
treatment with MPA and the side effects wear off as the drug is cleared from the
body.

137

Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion in Skinner, stated that Oklahoma's
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act 138 "deprives certain individuals of a right which
is basic to the perpetuation of a race - the right to have offspring."' 39 However, the
Court also said that legislatures "may mark and set apart the classes and types of
40
problems according to'the needs and as dictated or suggested by experience."

131

Id. at 536-37.

132

Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 7 (citing Money, supra note 25, at 220-21).

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id

136

Id.

137

Money, supra note 25, at 220-21.

138

OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 57

139

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 535 (1942). Oklahoma's statute fails under the equal

§ 171 (West 1991).

protection clause because the statute punishes one criminal but not another for the same type of crime.
Id at 540 ("Nor is [the legislature] prevented by the equal protection clause from confining
its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest.") (citing Miller v.
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 384 (1915)).
140
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The Court distinguished the sterilization upheld in Buck v. Bell, 4 from the
sterilization struck down in Skinner,' explaining that when sterilization of the
confined mentally ill is done in order that they might be released from
institutionalization, the procedure is done for the purpose of more nearly achieving
a form of equality by allowing institutionalized
mentally ill people to be released
43
and returned to the community.
Chemical treatment sterilizes female sexual offenders only temporarily and
is unlikely to sterilize males at all.'" Chemical treatment would allow a repeat
paraphilic sexual offender to be released from confinement in a prison or an
institution, and is preferable to releasing repeat sex offenders with no attempt at
treatment. Under the California statute, treatment is discontinued when the parolee
can demonstrate to the Board of Prison Terms that chemical treatment is no longer
necessary." The ability to discontinue distinguishes chemical treatment from the
permanence of surgical castration. A statute requiring MPA chemical treatment
along with concurrent psychotherapy as a condition of parole may pass even strict
scrutiny by the Supreme Court, providing that the statute is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest and the state is able to show there are no less
restrictive alternatives. A state has a compelling interest in the safety of its children
and in deterring and rehabilitating repeat sex offenders in order to return them to
society as productive, nondangerous members of the community. Chemical
treatment with counseling, narrowly tailored to affect only those offenders who
would benefit from the treatment is an acceptable requirement of parole. There is
no lasting impairment in females, and possibly no impairment in males, of the
fundamental right to procreate,'46 and similar to the state's compelling interest for
sterilization given in Buck,'4 7 the sexual offender gains release from confinement.
274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding a Virginia statute authorizing the surgical sterilization of
institutionalized persons deemed to be mentally ill).
141

142

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538.

143

Id. at 542.

144

PDR, supra note 16, at 2081; Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 7.

145

CAL.PENAL CODE § 645(d) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).

146

Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 7.

147
Buck, 274 U.S. at 205-06. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court upholding
surgical sterilization of institutionalized mentally ill patients and set forth the state's compelling
interest: "many defective persons who if now discharged would become a menace but if incapable of
procreating might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and
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Therefore, if a state were to use a chemical that, unlike MPA, actually achieves the
state's purpose in both men and women and were narrowly tailored to apply only
to offenders who benefitted from this treatment, such a statute might withstand even
strict scrutiny under a substantive due process analysis of a violation of the
fundamental right to procreate.
2.

Chemical Treatment May Not Be an Impermissible
Violation of Bodily Integrity

Requiring a specifically defined group of repeat sex offenders to undergo
chemical treatment as a condition of parole, although a substantial interference, may
not constitute a constitutionally impermissible deprivation of a convicted sex
offender's identified liberty interest in bodily integrity. The Supreme Court, in
48 upheld the principle of bodily integrity as a liberty interest
Washington v. Harper,'
saying, "[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body
'
The Court went
represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty."149
on to say that a prisoner's liberty interest in bodily integrity may be overridden in
cases where the prisoner presents a danger to himself or others and the treatment is
in the prisoner's medical interests, providing the procedures under which such
treatment is administered satisfy due process requirements. 50
Kansas v. Hendricks' recently examined the impairment of a paraphilic
prisoner's liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint by involuntary civil
commitment under Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act.152 The Court upheld
the Kansas civil commitment statute, stating that "[a]lthough freedom from physical
restraint 'has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause from arbitrary governmental action,' that liberty interest is not absolute. '5
The Court acknowledged that "[t]here are manifold restraints to which every person

to society." Id.
148

494 U.S. 210 (1990).

149

Id. at 229.

150

Id. at 210.

117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment of paraphilic offender
under Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act).
151

§ 59-29a01 (1994).

152

KAN. STAT. ANN.

153

Kansas, 117 S. Ct. at 2079 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
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is necessarily subject for the common good. 5On
any other basis organized society
4
could not exist with safety to its members,"'
In Kansas,'55 the Court ruled that a paraphilic could be subjected to
involuntary physical restraint only under narrowly defined conditions.' 6 In a case
of an internal physical restraint, such as mandatory chemical treatment, the liberty
interest is at least equal in importance to the liberty interest in freedom from
involuntary commitment as an external physical restraint. The Court said as much
in Washington v. Harper,"7 deciding that a "respondent possesses a significant
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The Court in Vitek v. Jones,59 in Riggins v. Nevada,6 ' and again in
Washington,' made clear that involuntary administration of medication could be
upheld against a prisoner's liberty interest under narrow circumstances where the
state can (1) establish an overriding justification for involuntary administration of
medication and (2) show that the treatment is in the medical interest of the
inmate. The Court reiterated these requirements in Kansas: "A finding of
dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to
justify indefinite involuntary commitment."'' 4 An additional reason such as "mental
illness" or "mental abnormality" is required to justify the substantial interference

154

Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts,197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (upholding governmental

compulsory vaccination)) (validating compulsory vaccination against religious objection).
155

Kansas, 117 S. Ct at 2079.

156

Id

157

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990).

158

Id See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-

01(1974).
159

445 U.S. 480 (1980).

160

504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).

161

Washington, 494 U.S. at 210.

162

Id at 220-24; See also Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.

163

Kansas, 117 S. Ct. 2072.

164

Id at 2080.
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with a person's right to liberty.!65 In Kansas, the Court grappled with the
uncertainty and disagreement among psychiatric professionals in defining the terms
of mental illness and mental abnormality and concluded that a diagnosis of
paraphilia is sufficient for a legal finding of mental illness or mental abnormality
(distinguished from a medical finding), 166 cautioning courts to give legislatures
broad latitude when acting in areas of "medical and scientific uncertainties."' 67 The
Court clearly reiterated the standard of review for prison regulations set forth in
Washington, 6 Turner v. Safley,'69 and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,"7 ° stating that
"[t]he proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed
to infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is
'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."""
Involuntary civil commitment of a paraphilic has been upheld when a state
is able to show an overriding justification and can present evidence that treatment
is in the inmate's medical interests. 2 Involuntary chemical treatment as a
condition of parole for paraphilics might likewise be upheld because of the state's
overriding justification in the safety of its children and the deterrence and
rehabilitation of its repeat sex offenders when the state can present evidence that
treatment is in the medical interest of the offender (the treatment actually decreases
an individual's propensity to engage in deviant sexual behavior).
Diagnosis of paraphilia is held to be sufficient for a legal finding of mental
illness or mental abnormality.
The California statute mandates chemical
165

Id.

166

Id. at 2072.

167

Id at 2081 n.3.

168

Washington, 494 U.S. at 224. "To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison

officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged
under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of
fundamental constitutional rights." Id.(internal quotations and citations omitted).
169

482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding restriction on the ability of prisoners to send mail to other

inmates stating the regulation was reasonably related to prison safety and security).
170

482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding prison work regulation even though the regulation kept

some prisoners from practicing their religion).
171

Washington, 494 U.S. at 223.

172

Id. at 222-23.

173

Kansas, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
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treatment with MPA for those sex offenders convicted of a second offense of child
molestation; the second conviction provides evidence of past criminal sexual
behavior 74 and evidence that the offender is likely to commit future similar sexual
crimes if not rehabilitated or deterred before being released on parole. 75 Chemical
treatment with MPA can be determined by a medical professional to be in the
76
inmate's medical interest depending on a variety of factors such as gender,
accurate diagnosis of paraphilia
by an appropriate medical professional, 77 and
7
1
administration.
appropriate
Chemical treatment enables a repeat sexual offender to be paroled, releasing
him from incarceration.
The Supreme Court has ruled that involuntary
institutionalization for treatment may be in the medical interest of a convicted
paraphilic and may likewise hold that chemical treatment with MPA, under specific
circumstances, would be medically appropriate, given its relatively few side effects
versus its benefits to the parolee and to society. Requiring MPA treatment realizes
the state's objective in a less externally restrictive manner than the available
alternatives of incarceration or institutionalization, but only when applied to an
appropriately narrow subgroup of sex offenders who voluntarily chose to undergo
treatment in conjunction with counseling.
3.

MPA Treatment is Arguably the Least Intrusive Alternative

Chemical treatment with MPA must also satisfy the requirement of no less
intrusive or restrictive alternatives before it can successfully survive a substantive
due process attack after Riggins.7 7 Treatment of paraphilia traditionally primarily
consisted of psychotherapy, which has not proven all that effective, as evidenced

174

Id. at 2082.

175

Id.

176

PDR, supra note 16, at 2081.

177

Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 36, at 602.

178

Id.

179
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127. The involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs during trial
in order to make defendant competent to stand trial constitutes a deprivation of the liberty protected
by due process. Where the trial court had not attempted to make any findings that the medication was
medically appropriate for the defendant, nor had the court considered any "less intrusive alternatives"
that could be used to protect the defendant's and the state's interests, the defendant's right to due
process was impermissibly violated because of the possibility his defense was impaired. Id.
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by the relatively high rate of recidivism among sexual offenders.!" Current penal

sanctions do not fare any better.'

Studies of paraphilics voluntarily undergoing

chemical treatment used in conjunction with group or individual counseling for

paraphilia have shown the greatest reduction in recidivism,'

indicating that

chemical treatment combined with counseling is the most effective therapy
currently available for paraphilia.'83 Aversion therapies such as electric shock
treatment,14 or other therapies consisting of surgical castration,8 5 and stereotaxic
neurosurgery (surgically destroying portions of the brain believed responsible for

sexual response), 86 are more externally physically intrusive than chemical treatment
with MPA and have the added feature of being permanently disabling in some way.

Although weekly IM injections are undeniably intrusive, the injections are less of
an intrusion than the existing alternatives with the exception of psychiatric
counseling that, used alone, is not as effective as using MPA with counseling. MPA

treatment is not as visibly obvious an alteration of a person's body as is surgical
castration or stereotaxic neurosurgery.

The chemical treatment is intrusive,

however, in a subtle, internal way. MPA alters an individual's basic biological

180

Fuller, supra note 9, at 604. "Psychotherapy is useful in the treatment of some child

molesters but probably not all although the literature on individual psychotherapy for child molesters
is sparse and preponderantly consists of case reports." Id.
181

See Jorgen Ortmann, The Treatmentof Sexual Offenders, 3 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 443,

447-51 (1980).
182

See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.

183

See Icenogle, supra note 43, at 282-85.

184

Don Riesenberg, MotivationsStudied andTreatments Devisedin Attempt to ChangeRapists"

Behavior,257 JAMA 899-900 (1987) (discussing the receipt of an electric shock whenever a subject
exhibits the deviant behavior). See also Icenogle, supra note 43, at 283.
185

See Icenogle, supra note 43, at 282-85. Surgical castration involves the surgical removal

of the testes as a treatment for male sex offenders and has "been discarded due to its permanence,
invasiveness, and mutilating characteristics." Id. at 281.
186

Id at 280-83.

Stereotaxic neurosurgery involves the identification of the areas of the brain that
accumulate large amounts of sexual hormones and, when destroyed, produce
changes in sexual behavior.... In 1976, a government task force on the issue of
psychosurgery concluded that stereotaxic neurosurgery held promise, but warned
that its use should be restricted to designated research centers to assure the proper
safeguards are taken.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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functioning in a way that is not fully understood.187 While there may be no outward
physical mutilation or alteration, there is an internal alteration that is at least as, if
not more, intrusive by virtue of unknown biological manipulation, than surgical or
aversion therapies. The "less intrusive" argument must therefore rest primarily on
the transient effects of the drug.' 8 MPA's effects supposedly last only as long as
the patient is undergoing treatment, arguably making MPA the least intrusive
alternative.
C.

ProceduralDue Process ConcernsAre Not Insurmountable

The procedures surrounding the administration of MPA chemical treatment
must be sufficient to protect the offender's interests as against the state.189 "The
procedural due process issue concerns the minimum procedures required by the
Constitution for determining that the individual's liberty interest actually is
outweighed in a particular instance.""'
Reviewing the Supreme Court's procedural due process analysis in
Washington,191 Riggins, 92 Foucha,193 and Kansas"' yields the required procedural
protections for medical treatment of an inmate. First, there must be a medical
finding of mental illness or mental abnormality. 95 Second, a medical treatment
must be in an inmate's medical interests. 96 Third, the medical treatment ordered
Id at 284. "The mechanism by which MPA lowers libido is not completely understood..
. [T]he ability of MPA to decrease paraphilic behavior... may be due to a tranquilizing effect on
the brain. It is unclear whether MPA has any specific effect on the sexual centers of the brain." Id.
187

(footnotes omitted).
188

See supranotes 64-67 and accompanying text.

189

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1974).

190

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,220 (1990) (citing Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299

(1982)).
191

494 U.S. at 210.

192

504 U.S. 127 (1992).

193

504 U.S. 71.

194

117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).

195

See id. at 2080.

196

See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-35; see also Washington, 494 U.S. at 227.
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must be essential for the inmate's safety or for the safety of others 97 Fourth, there
must be no less intrusive alternatives to the medical treatment ordered' 9 Chemical
treatment of paraphilia as a condition of parole will likely be upheld under a
procedural due process analysis if the state is able to show the inmate's interests are
adequately protected in meeting all four procedural protections.
A psychiatrist or mental health professional must examine and evaluate the
sexual offender and reach a medical finding or diagnosis of mental illness or mental
abnormality 99 The Court has paved the way for acceptance of paraphilia as a
mental abnormality in Kansas,"° finding paraphilia is sufficient for a legal
diagnosis while recognizing psychiatric professional disagreement as to whether
paraphilia constitutes a mental illness.2"'
Once a diagnosis of paraphilia is made, treatment may be allowed,
providing the state can show chemical treatment with MPA or its chemical
equivalent is in the inmate's medical interest?02 MPA treatment is a part of a
comprehensive therapy program shown to be effective in decreasing the overriding
sexual demands of some paraphilics, medically benefitting such an inmate by
allowing him to better order his life and return to society as a potentially
contributing, nondangerous member of the community? 3 The Supreme Court
examined the issue of having an independent decision maker for cases of mental
abnormality in Washington, 4 and upheld a procedure where the decision maker,
although not independent, was not involved in the current treatment or diagnosis of
the inmate, and the medical treatment was "at all times consistent with the degree
of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent psychiatrist acting in

197

See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-35; see also Washington, 494 U.S. at 227.

198

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135; see also Washington, 494 U.S. at 225-26.

199

See Kansas, 117 S.Ct. at 2080- 81.

200

See generally Kansas, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (discussing psychiatric evaluation and the definition

of mental illness or mental abnormality).
201

See Kansas, 117 S. Ct. at 2081 n.3.

202

See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-35.

203

See Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 16.

204

494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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the same or similar circumstances,, 0 5 The fact that the decision-maker was
employed within the system seeking to confine the inmate did not automatically
disqualify him or her without proof of bias in favor of state ordered chemical
treatment.20 6 *A state psychiatrist can diagnose paraphilia after a comprehensive
psychiatric evaluation of an individual offender absent a showing of bias toward
diagnosing paraphilia in repeat sex offenders.
The state fulfills the third procedural requirement by showing that chemical
treatment as a condition of parole is essential for the paraphilic offender's safety
and for the safety of a state's citizens.2 7 The state is also able to present evidence
fulfilling the last procedural requirement: there is no less intrusive alternative to
chemical treatment.2 " Currently there are no less permanent, intrusive alternative
treatments for achieving the state's overriding purpose of reducing recidivism in
this narrow classification of sexual offenders. 0 9
A state, by carefully providing all the procedural protections required by the
Constitution, can draft a statute requiring chemical treatment for paraphilic sexual
offenders as a condition of parole that can withstand a procedural due process
attack, but it remains to be seen whether a state will be able to provide all the
necessary requisites of the procedural protections such as correct diagnosis and
appropriate treatment for the narrow group of offenders for which such treatment
is warranted.
Under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act2 0 upholding involuntary
civil commitment of a paraphilic,2 the committed defendant is permitted three
separate avenues of review when requesting release from institutionalization: (1)
an annual review determining whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, continued
detention was appropriate under the initial confinement standards; (2) the
opportunity to receive specified authorization at any time to petition for release; and

205

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 n.l1, 233-34 (1990) (internal citations and

quotations omitted).
206

See Washington, 494 U.S. at 228-36.

207

See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-35; see also supra notes 16-74 and accompanying text.

208

See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135; see also Washington, 494 U.S. at 222.

209

See supra notes 179-189 and accompanying text.

210

KAN. STAT. ANN.,

§ 59-29a01 (1994).

Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
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(3) the right to petition for release at any time without specified authorization.212
It is unclear if the Supreme Court would require this same extent of review for a
parolee undergoing chemical treatment. Two Supreme Court cases, although
relevant, do not address the necessary procedural protection afforded a parolee
living outside of a state facility. Kansas concerns civil commitment based on ajury
finding that a paraphilic defendant is a sexually violent predator.213 Washington
deals with the constitutionality of a prison policy authorizing involuntary treatment
with antipsychotic drugs2 4 Both cases deal only with an individual under the
control and care of the state, within a state facility, as opposed to an individual
released into the community.
D.

An Offender Must Have the Right to Reject Parole

A convicted repeat sexual offender must be allowed the option of accepting
the conditions of parole or staying incarcerated when the conditions of parole are
offensive or burdensome? 15 Repeat sex offenders must be given the right to reject
chemical treatment as a condition of parole and to elect to finish out their sentence.
Many offenders may find the condition too invasive or may simply not want
therapy, in which case the therapy would be of uncertain value. The Supreme Court
has not ruled on a convicted defendant's right to refuse probation, and the state and
federal courts are divided on the issue: some courts hold that a defendant may
choose to refuse probation and serve the suspended sentence or demand that the
court impose a sentence; other courts hold that a defendant does not have an
unqualified right to refuse parole because of society's interest in having offenders

212

Id. at 2078.

213

Id. at 2072.

214

494 U.S. 210, 213-15 (1990).

215

See Jay M. Zitter, Right Of Convicted Defendant To Refuse Probation,28 A.L.R.4TH, 736

(1981). For example, the court in State v. Randolph, 316 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1982) held that
a convicted criminal defendant who is placed on probation pursuant to sentencing
guidelines has a right to refuse the probation and to demand the execution of his
sentence if the conditions of probation make probation more onerous than a prison
sentence, and if it could not be demonstrated that society's interests would suffer
by vacating the probation sentence.
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paroled for rehabilitative reasons. 6 The concept of a chemical treatment parole
condition is new, the treatment is experimental, and this condition of parole
fundamentally alters an individual's physiological functioning. Many may find the
imposition of the treatment more burdensome than serving out the sentence for the
offense. Because the condition of parole is experimental and profoundly impacts
the parolee's physiological functioning in ways that currently are not fully
understood, an inmate must be afforded the opportunity to refuse MPA treatment
and remain incarcerated
1.

Meaningful Voluntary Choice or Coercion in Accepting
the Condition

A primary concern when affording a convicted sex offender a choice
between chemical treatment as a condition of parole and serving the sentence is
whether the offender is capable of making.a truly voluntary as opposed to a coerced
choice. The situation is analogous to the possibility of "inherent coercion regarding
the consent of involuntarily committed individuals to treatment,'"' 7 in that there
may be no actual voluntary choice given when an individual is forced to choose
between two evils.
The Supreme Court has held that a defendant's choice to enter a guilty plea
and accept sentencing (all the while maintaining his innocence) is a voluntary
choice although acknowledging that such an individual may be primarily motivated
by the fear of receiving a harsher sentence in taking his chances with the imposition
29
of a verdict and sentencing after a trial.218 The Court, in Bordenkircherv. Hayes, '
acknowledged that some pleas may involve difficult choices but such pleas are
nonetheless "inevitable and permissible," ' falling within the definition of a
voluntary choice. The choice between undergoing chemical treatment to obtain

216

See Zitter, stpra note 215, at 736; see also United States v. Thomas, 934 F.2d 840 (7th Cir.

1991) (holding that a criminal defendant does not have an unqualified right to reject probation using
a balancing test between a convicted defendant's interest in rejecting onerous conditions of parole and
society's interest in requiring conditions of parole as a means to rehabilitate a convicted tax evader).
217

Fitzgerald, supranote 19, at 17.

See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 31 (1970) (referring to Brady and noting that a defendant who chooses to plead guilty to lesser
charge to avoid the possibility of a death sentence is making a "free and rational choice").
218

219

434 U.S. 357 (1978).

220

Id. at 364.
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release by parole or to remain in prison necessarily contains an "inherent degree of
coercion,"'" possibly motivated by a fear of incarceration; nevertheless an
individual should be permitted to make such a choice. Convicted sex offenders may
be motivated to accept the condition of chemical treatment from a fear of
imprisonment or a desire for release, but the choice is theoretically no different in
risk of coercion than any other parole condition. Thus, the choice should be
permissible after an offender has been diagnosed as an individual who would
benefit from treatment, and fully informed of the nature and possible side effects
of the treatment, including the existing alternatives to treatment. An offender must
first be diagnosed as suffering from paraphilia before being given the option of
chemical treatment because many offenders might choose treatment as merely a
means of reducing their sentences, regardless of whether they actually suffer from
paraphilia. Without allowing the option of chemical treatment, a qualifying
offender is left incarcerated, institutionalized, or, in the case of ineffective"
traditional treatment methods, imprisoned by his own aberrant sexual urges.
2.

MPA Treatment Furthers the Purpose of Parole

Requiring MPA treatment of male paraphilic sexual offenders convicted
of a second offense arguably furthers the purposes of parole by allowing the
rehabilitation and release of offenders. California's chemical treatment statute
states, "Any person guilty of a second offense.., shall, upon parole, undergo
medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment or its chemical equivalent, in addition to
"
any other punishment prescribed for that offense or any other provision of law.
Parole is created by state statute to serve the state's purposes of rehabilitation and
deterrence, and parole boards are often given broad discretionary power in
furthering these purposes. ' However, an inmate has no constitutional right to
parole. 4
The Supreme Court has stated that the method of deciding whether to grant
parole is at best a primarily subjective appraisal depending in large part on
"informed predictions as to what would best serve [correctional purposes] or the

221

Fitzgerald, supranote 19, at 17.

2

CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(b) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).

223

See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1

(1979).
224

Greenholtz,442 U.S. at 7.
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"Probation is the attempted saving of a man
safety and welfare of the inmate."'
who has taken one wrong step, and whom the judge thinks to be a brand who can
be plucked from the burning." ' 6 The safety and welfare of the inmate is best served
by release from incarceration and by receiving treatment that affords a substantial
chance to lead a productive life free from the overwhelming sexual desires that
cause the offender to commit sexual crimes 2 7 The safety of the public is best
served by means that reduce or stop sexual offender recidivism. As long as MPA
actually is effective in reducing a particular paraphilic offender's recidivism, it
accomplishes the purposes of parole. But the individual effectiveness determination
seems difficult to make within the short period of time between when MPA
treatment would start and when the offender receives parole.
There can be little question that states are looking for a method that will
allow them to safely parole sex offenders. In addition to the humanitarian aspect
of granting parole, the economic reality of increasing incarceration costs leads to
the undeniable need to find viable alternatives to imprisonment or
institutionalization of repeat sexual offenders. The nation's federal and state prison
population grew by 55,876 inmates during 1996?22 Counting both prison and jail
inmates, there were over 1.6 million adults behind bars as of June 30, 1996.229 The
estimated cost of incarcerating 1.6 million inmates is over $26.8 billion annually. 0
Forecasts indicate that by the year 2000 the total prison population will be in the
neighborhood of 2.25 million inmates? Costs in areas such a health care are
increasing rapidly, due in part to an aging prison population. 2 The size of the
elderly population is doubling every four years as a result of longer sentences and

2M

Id. at 9-10.

226

United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928).

227

See MERCK, supra note 32, at 1498.

228

See Growth In Prison Inmate Population Slows, U.S. Says More Than 1.18 Million

CurrentlyBehind Bars, CHIC. TRIB., June 23, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 3560600.
229

See id.

230

See Kenneth Adams, The Bull Market in Corrections,(PrisonsAfter the Building Boom:

Where Do We Go From Here? Special Symposium Proceedings) 76 PRISON JOURNAL 4 (1996),
availablein 1996 WL 13534571.
231

See id.

232

See id.
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restrictions on parole, and it costs $69,000 a year to house an inmate over sixty
years of age. 3
Granting a repeat paraphilic sexual offender parole on the condition that he
undergo MPA chemical treatment and counseling represents a viable alternative to
incarceration" 4 or to parole with no requirement of treatment. Given the
complexity of the evaluation required and the procedures necessary for accurate
administration, requiring chemical treatment may be more expensive than
incarceration. One consideration in favor of chemical treatment is that parole
would enable a paraphilic sexual offender to return to society and to the workforce
where he would then have the opportunity to earn the money to support himself and
possibly help alleviate the state's cost of his treatment,e 5 which would be a more
effective utilization of the state's resources than simply warehousing inmates and
paying for their support.
E.

MPA Treatment Is Not Crueland UnusualPunishmentfor Male
Paraphilics

Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 6
A statute requiring chemical treatment as a condition of parole can survive an
Eighth Amendment challenge if the treatment is applied to those offenders who
benefit from it. For the purposes of this Comment, chemical treatment as a
condition of parole will be characterized as a punishment. If such treatment is held
not to be punishment, then the Eighth Amendment may not apply.
The Supreme Court, in Greggv. Georgia, 37 explained that the definition
of "cruel and unusual" is not a static one, but changes with "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." " In Lee v. Tahash,2 9
the court elaborated on the definition of "cruel and unusual" as punishment "of such

233

See id.

234

See Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 16-17.

235

See id

236

See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

237

428 U.S. 153, 173 (1997).

238

Id.

239

352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965).
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as to shock general conscience or to be intolerable in
character or consequences
'0
fundamental fairness."
One perspective of the character of mandatory MPA treatment as a
condition of parole is simply as a medically appropriate chemical treatment
administered by weekly injections4 until an offender demonstrates that treatment
is no longer necessary.2 42 On a deeper, more disturbing level, MPA treatment is an
involuntary, and possibly indefinite, chemical alteration of a person's mental and
biological functioning in order to further a state's interests 3 Under the first
characterization, MPA treatment is not very shocking. A weekly injection is less
frequent than the injections self-administered by insulin dependent diabetics.244
Society and the offender both gain some benefit from requiring MPA treatment as
a condition of parole.245 The offender is afforded a better quality of life by being
able to live and work outside of prison, and society is protected from the danger of
a repeat sexual offender. 6
The second characterization of chemical treatment as state-imposed mental
and biological alteration is initially and appropriately shocking to the general
conscience, recalling the biological alteration experiments committed by the Nazis,
and appears intolerable by current standards of decency? 7 "Some judges find state
biological alteration - in the form of drugs, other psychiatric interventions, or
sterilization - a profoundly threatening, political and social phenomenon."248
Requiring chemical treatment as a condition of parole may not be so shocking or
240

Id. at 972.

241

See Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 6.

242

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(d) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).

243

See Sheldon Gelman, The BiologicalAlteration Cases, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1203,

1205-06 (1995) (providing an insightful look at biological alteration and the disquieting nature of such

alteration).
244

See

MERCK,

supra note 32, at 1077 (stating that most diabetics can be controlled with a

single daly injection).
245

See Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 3.

246

See id

See Gelman, supra note 243, at 1300-01 (examining the constitutional issues of biological
alteration and determining that it "undermines premises of biological equality and human dignity that
provide the foundation for our rights. It destroys our Constitution.").
247

248

Id. at 1300.
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unfair as to be cruel and unusual punishment, however, in light of a previous
Supreme Court decision.2 49 Involuntary treatment with drugs is not without
precedent in the United States. The Supreme Court, in Washington," has upheld
involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs when an inmate poses a danger to
himself or others, and MPA's side effects on the male paraphilie2 51 are relatively
mild compared with antipsychotic drug side effects. 5 2 If involuntary administration
of a drug having greater debilitating side effects than MPA is not intolerable to
concepts of fundamental fairness" 3 when administered to mentally ill or dangerous

prison inmates for safety reasons,254 then requiring treatment as a condition of

parole using a drug with less debilitating side effects should not necessarily shock

the conscience or be found intolerable to the concept of fundamental fairness when
administered to protect the public safety and welfare. Furthermore, MPA's side
effects end when treatment is discontinued." s The transient nature of the effects
appears to make the treatment less threatening to the conscience because the
offender can be returned to his original state once the drug is discontinued.
A punishment will also be found cruel and unusual if it is greatly
disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed' 6 Under California's

statute,

7 MPA

249

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).

250

See id.

treatment is mandatory when a sexual offender is convicted for the

Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 7 (noting that possible side effect include weight gain,
dramatically decreased sperm count, and testicular atrophy). "Most of the reported side effects are
extremely rare." Id.

251

See Gelman, supranote 243, at 1206 (noting that antipsychotic drug side effects include "an
irreversible neurological disorder.., in 10% to 25% of recipients .... Other side effects include
mental distress, tremors, symptoms of Parkinson's disease, and in rare cases, death.").
252

253

See Lee, 352 F.2d 970.

254

See Gelman, supra note 243, at 1205.

255

See Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 7.

See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a state law making the
"status" of narcotic addiction a criminal offense inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment); see also
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381-82 (1910) (holding that the inhibition against cruel and
unusual punishment is directed not only against torture, but against all punishments which, by their
excessive length or severity, are greatly disproportionate to the offenses charged).
256

257

CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(b) & (c) (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1998).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

39

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:853

second time of the following offenses: sodomy, lewd or lascivious acts, oral
copulation, and penetration by foreign objecft 8 against a victim less than thirteen
years old. 9 Requiring a repeat paraphilic sex offender to undergo chemical
treatment while on parole is not an imposition of a disproportionate sentence26
considering the devastating effects of sexual molestation on children, effects that
continue for years or for a lifetime? 6 Allowing states to require, as a condition of
parole, treatment that directly eliminates a paraphilic's drive to commit sexual
crimes recognizes "the wide range of power that the legislature possesses to adapt
its penal laws to conditions as they may exist, and punish the crimes of men
according to their forms and frequency."262
263 stated a
Justice Brennan, concurring in Furman v. Georgia,
third
consideration under the Eighth Amendment
A punishment is excessive if it is unnecessary: the infliction of a
severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity
where it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering.
If there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to
achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, the
punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive. 6

258

See id § 645(c).

259

See id. § 645(b).

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986-87 (1991) (providing three relevant factors
in the proportionality determination: (1) the inherent gravity of the offense, (2) the sentences imposed
for similarly grave offenses in the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences imposed for the same crime in
other jurisdictions).
260

See Lauren J. Abrams, Sexual Offenders and the Use of Depo-Provera,22 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 565, 568 (1985); see also Fuller, supra note 9, at 603 (noting that posttraumatic stress disorder
261

may develop in victims immediately after the sexual abuse; however, symptoms commonly develop

or redevelop in the victim months or years after the molestation). The victim's impairment may be
mild or it may severely affect nearly all aspects of his life. Fuller, supra note 9, at 603.
262

Weems, 217 U.S. at 379.

263

408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).

264

Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The only effective therapy for paraphilia at this time is treatment with MPA or its
chemical equivalent used in conjunction with counseling; there are no less severe
alternatives that offer the hope of an effective treatment for paraphilia.
Requiring treatment with MPA as a condition of parole is excessive
however, if applied to offenders who will not benefit from such treatment. MPA
treatment does constitute cruel and unusual punishment for female sexual offenders
because the treatment is not effective and therefore is unnecessary.2 65 MPA does
nothing to reduce the propensity to commit sexual crimes in at least ninety-five
percent of female paraphilic sexual offenders;2" therefore, the treatment "is nothing
more than the pointless infliction" of sterility by chemical contraception, 6 7 which
is cruel and unusual punishment. MPA treatment is also cruel and unusual
punishment for those male sex offenders who do not suffer from paraphilia because
the treatment does not affect their propensity for deviant sexual behavior.
IV. OFFENDERS SHOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY
TO WAIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

If the Supreme Court determines that mandatory chemical treatment as a
condition of parole violates due process and Eighth Amendment protections, a
convicted paraphilic, after a medical determination that such treatment is in the
should be allowed to waive constitutional protections
offender's medical interests,
26
treatment.
receive
and
In Brady v. UnitedStates,269 the Supreme Court set forth the standard for
a valid waiver of constitutional rights.2 71 Waiver in a criminal proceeding must be
done voluntarily and "must be knowing, intelligent [and] done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. 2 7'

265

See PDR, supra note 16, at 2081.

266

See id.

267

Furman,408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring).

268

See Kenneth B. Fromson, Note, BeyondAn Eye ForAn Eye: CastrationAs An Alternative

Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HtM. RTS. 311, 333-34 (1994).
269

397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).

270

See id.

271

See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972); Jells v.

dissenting).
Ohio, 498 U.S. 1111, 1113 (1991) (Marshal, J.,
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Voluntary waiver is given when there is no physical or mental coercion to
do so.272 A defendant motivated by the possibility of a reduced sentence is still
capable of voluntarily waiving fundamental protections.273 Even though a twice
convicted sexual offender may be influenced to waive his constitutional protections
by his desire for release, such waiver is still capable of being voluntary.27 4
Intelligent waiver is made when (1) a defendant has competent counsel to
advise him, (2) the defendant understands the charges against him, and (3) the
defendant is deemed competent2 75 The Supreme Court has stated that waiver of
certain fundamental rights should be allowed only in open court to protect the
defendant.276 This protection is particularly important in chemical treatment cases
because of the experimental nature of the condition. The court is then in the
position to fully explain the consequences of waiving fundamental protections to
a defendant, and can ascertain whether waiver is truly being made within the
standard set forth in Brady.2 77 Twice convicted sexual offenders should not be
required to waive due process and Eighth Amendment protections guaranteed them
under the Constitution to receive effective treatment for a mental illness but, if
necessary, should be permitted to do so.
V. CONCLUSION

California's chemical treatment statute fails constitutional scrutiny under
several provisions: equal protection, substantive due process, and cruel and unusual
punishment. The statute is impermissibly over-inclusive, including in its purview
sexual offenders for whom MPA treatment has not been shown by medical literature
to be effective. However, MPA treatment of male paraphilic sexual offenders is
arguably the least restrictive alternative to achieving the state's purpose of
rehabilitation, specific deterrence, and protection of the health and welfare of its
citizens. MPA treatment coupled with psychiatric counseling has reduced the

272

See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.

273

See id. at 751.

274

See id.

275

Id. at 756.

276

Id. at 748 (stating that the waiver of the right to trial by entering a guilty plea, and waiver

of the right to counsel should be done only in open court).
277

Id.
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overwhelming sexual urges of male paraphilics in case studies78 and side effects
are temporary.2 79 A twice convicted sexual offender must be given a voluntary
choice between undergoing treatment and receiving parole, or reffising'treatment
and remaining incarcerated, both because of the experimental nature of MPA
treatment and because the treatment is not effective in achieving the desired
deterrence unless an offender wants to change his deviant behavior.
This Comment does not contend that a statute requiring chemical treatment
as a condition of parole cannot be drafted to withstand Constitutional attack. Such
a statute must be narrowly drawn to apply only to those offenders medically
determined to benefit from the treatment because there exists a huge potential for
inaccurate administration of MPA to offenders who will not benefit from treatment,
but will receive parole by undergoing treatment, misleading the public into
believing that these offenders have been rehabilitated. It remains to be seen
whether the criminal justice system is capable of such a novel and expensive
undertaking. The treatment must involve a diagnosis of a psychiatric illness or
abnormality, evaluation of alternative treatment options, prescription of, and
adjustment of, medication, along with a follow up of administration and effects on
each patient/parolee. These elements have traditionally been the province of the
medical profession, not the criminal justice system. Pertinent questions, although
beyond the scope of this Comment, are whether the criminal justice system should,
or would want to, legislate the administration of medication to criminals.
Alternative chemical treatments as a condition of parole for psychiatric
illnesses that cause criminal behavior will continue to be an issue affecting the
criminal justice system as medical science discovers new chemical therapies for
such illnesses. But the mentally ill criminal defendant must not be statutorily forced
to participate in a continual biological state experiment to further society's interest
in rehabilitation, deterrence, and cost control. State-imposed chemical treatment is
a concept that affects all of its citizens in profound ways, subtly shifting our
perceptions of punishment and bodily integrity. Lying in the shadows of such a
treatment scheme is the specter of ever-increasing state control over the most
private and protected areas of self. Chemical treatment of specific populations
demands stringent procedural protections to guard against the possibility of
invidious discrimination280 and should never be applied for the purpose of effecting
a quick, seemingly easy fix at the expense of the constitutional rights of citizens,
convicted criminals or not.

278

See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.

279

See Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 7.

280

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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In summation, Laurence Tribe appropriately warns:
Those charged with the responsibility of choice must avoid
too myopic an adherence to the matter at hand, recognizing that the
ultimate results of incremental change might be wholly alien, and
perhaps profoundly objectionable, to those who acquiesce step by
step. And yet they must be equally sensitive not to misuse the
power which comes with the authority to identify some
governmental impositions, but not others, as harbingers of
disastrous change; they must be scrupulous to distinguish the slip
which1 leads inexorably down the slope from the one which does
28

not.

Linda Beckman

TRIBF, supranote 85, at 1307 (citing Kahn, The Tyranny ofSmall Decisions, KYKLOS: INT'L.
REV. FOR SOC. SCL 19, 23 (1966)).
281
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